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ABSTRACT 
“THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF VILA GALÉ TO THE SOUTH OF BRAZIL” 
This working project will consist in the study of an internationalization plan of Vila Galé 
to the South of Brazil, focusing on a new model for the company: the Vila Galé Express. 
A company profile is traced, as well its goals and strategies. Aligning a complete 
definition of the Express type hotel with several internal and external analysis aiming the 
South of Brazil, it was possible to elaborate an entry strategy and assess its financial 
viability, concluding that an Investment in the South needs to be cautious while, at the 
same time, fast and efficient or it won’t be sustainable. 
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VILA GALÉ 
The Group 
Vila Galé is a Portuguese hotel chain created in 1986 by three families. Initially, the 
objective was simply to open one hotel in Praia da Galé, Algarve. However, this first 
project was so successful that the group growth started right away. As so, until 1995, 
through the acquisition of lands, existent hotels and buildings under construction, VG 
expanded its portfolio through the Portuguese southern region. In 1996 the second stage 
began, with the goal of getting totally national, evolving first to the Lisbon area and then 
Oporto and Coimbra’s. Nowadays, with hotels also in Madeira and Alentejo, the group 
believes it covers already the main touristic areas in Portugal. Therefore, VG was able to 
create a quite strong presence in Portugal in these 27 years that past since its creation, 
being now placed in second in the ranking of largest groups operating in the country, with 
3808 rooms/apartments in 2012i. Although is still relatively distant from the third place 
(Accor Hotels with 2890 rooms), the leader of this table is far beyond VG numbers: 
Pestana Hotels&Resorts/Pestana Pousadas had 6483 rooms/apartments in 2012. 
However, VG rooms are dispersed through much less properties than the leading 
competitor. Plus, the group started operating 14 years after Pestana, which might tell us 
that, following the current expansion rhythm, and considering that the leader hasn’t got 
much more to evolve in the country, it could reach the national top in few years. 
This strong presence and growth in the country encouraged VG to go abroad. The destiny 
chosen for the first internationalization was the northeast of Brazil, since it was spotted a 
lack of Resorts in this country and the region was a quite good place for this kind of 
hotels. It is possible to say that the internationalization strategy was through a Greenfield 
strategy, besides the fact that the second hotel (opened 2 years after the first one) was 
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developed on the lights of a Management Contract strategy. Some years after, VG ended 
up buying this second Resort, but nowadays two out of 24 hotels in the portfolio are still 
under this kind of management since 2009 in Brazil. Its presence in this country relies 
mostly in the Northeast region, with only one in the Southeast and another one coming 
up at this same region. (See Exhibit 1 for Company Portfolio.) 
The group is considerably centralized, being the following departments, besides 
Administration, shared by all the hotels in the portfolio: Marketing and Sales; Human 
Resources; Administrative and Financial; Legal; Technical, and; IT. There’s also an 
Operational department coordinating each hotel work and so each propriety has solely a 
purely operational structure. (See Exhibit 2 for Organizational Chart.) 
VG has been quite successful among its customers, such in Portugal as in Brazil. 
Observing clients’ reviews at booking.com, the most valued feature in Brazil was 
Comfort, followed right away by Location. In Portugal, the most valued one was 
Location, followed closely by Staff and Clean. Is possible to consider that, so far, what 
VG is able to provide better is then the hotel location (which is reasonable since the group 
is so careful in its acquisitions). However, both in Portugal and Brazil, the worse quality 
of VG hotels was Value for Money scoring 7.5 in Portugal and 6.9 in Brazil which 
indicates that the hotels might be moderately overpriced, or at least are not perceived as 
really opportunities (see Exhibit 3 for complete booking.com Scorecard). Also, looking 
at the internal reviews, the low Value for Money stated by booking.com can be seen in the 
overall low values in the column Voltaria?1, despite almost every quality before analysed 
by the surveys had had quite high scores. (See Exhibit 4 for complete Internal Survey.) 
                                                          
1 “Would you come back?” in a literal translation 
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The Strategy 
VG mission is defined by one simple sentence “Sempre perto de si”2 and its culture is 
aligned with eight values: Appreciation, Innovation, Loyalty, Ambition, Assurance, 
Accessibility, Freedom and Efficiency (literal translation). These pillars were defined 
properly by the managers when VG was already 15 years old but it was based on the 
management practices until then and it is how the group is still administrated. 
For the future, VG not only wants to find new international destinations but also desires 
to expand its Brazilian portfolio further south, either in number of properties as also in 
type of hotels. This strategy is sought in order to balance the characteristic Resorts’ 
seasonality. In Portugal, a seasonal balance was achieved through the investment in 
City/Leisure hotels. The Brazilian strategy would be similar, with already one city hotel 
functioning and another one under construction. However, to boost this South American 
expansion, VG wanted to apply a new project already thought but never used – the Vila 
Galé Express. 
VILA GALÉ EXPRESS 
To define properly VGE it’s important to settle first the concept of the Express hotels. 
This model can be seen as the fusion of the two more common types of accommodation: 
the Bed&Breakfast and the Budget. The first one embraces normally small family hotels, 
from 4 to 11 rooms, quite typical in the USii. The second holds for regular hotels, 
relatively large, with less amenities than the competitors in order to practice lower prices. 
As so, Express hotels might be identified as relatively large hotels (around 120 rooms) 
offering basically only good accommodation and breakfast as the B&B type, but keeping 
a relatively low price through the elimination of common amenities usually used by other 
                                                          
2 “Always close to you” in a literal translation 
INTERNATIONALIZATION FIELD LAB 
4 
 
hotels (e.g. gym, pool or restaurant). This type targets people who came in town just for 
business and consequently have no time nor interest in using the several additional 
amenities besides a good night sleep, internet and breakfast like other business hotels 
offer. 
The two brands leading this sub-market are: Holiday Inn Express (from the 
InterContinental Hotels Group) and Ibis (from the Accor Group). These are the ideal 
brands to be benchmarked. 
Benchmarking 
Assessing the best-in-class would help not only to understand how to operate in the 
market, as it would also allow VG to spot faults, and consequently, opportunities for the 
company, in those models. Currently, the two best-in-class, HIE and Ibis, dominate 
completely the Express sub-market. Their practices and amenities are relatively similar 
and are the ones that most characterize this hotel business sector. Both offer “excellent” 
large beds, free breakfast and Wi-Fi in all rooms. Discrepancies are scarce, limited to a 
competition based on the principle of “who serves better the amenity that both offer”, 
leading HIE to offer allegedly better Wi-Fi connection, while Ibis optioned for a larger 
schedule for breakfasts. It is also quite important to point the two key success factors for 
this type of hotel: location and price. The location of every HIE is carefully oriented to 
the business customers, leading to locations like near the airports or business centres. Ibis, 
even though less than HIE, is also oriented to business customers, providing then hotels 
close to business centres. Prices are the main advantage for these hotels being chosen over 
other Business hotels. By offering less amenities, like gym or pool, Express hotels are 
able to lower their prices relatively to other Business/City hotels in good locations, 
targeting people who have no interest into these additional services. 
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It should also be taken into consideration some hotel indicators from these two brands, 
like the Occupancy Rate, Average Daily Rate and the RevPAR. Regarding HIE, the brand 
presented in the first half of 2013 an overall OR of 57.25%. The ADR for the total 2045 
hotels was US$101.69 in the same semester and the RevPAR US$67.22iii. Concerning the 
economy range of Accor, from which make part the three Ibis brands, it is possible to 
verify a higher than HIE OR, 67.7%, but a lower ADR and RevPAR, US$72.8 and 
US$49.4.3,iv 
VG has already some plans regarding this project. As Gonçalo Rebelo de Almeida, VG’s 
administrator, said “We are talking about hotels in cities, between 80 and 120 rooms, with 
the size of the bedroom with bathroom around 22m2 […] As additional services there will 
only be one coffee shop for breakfasts and snacks. The rooms would have their normal 
equipment: it is vital to have a good LCD screen, good internet access, basic features of 
the Express model.” The brand itself is also already thought: it will be a sub-brand, so 
“Vila Galé Express”, with a logo in white and a green. 
SOUTH OF BRAZIL 
Brazil is a federative republic composed by 26 States and one Federal District. These 
States are grouped, even though only for geographical purposes, into five regions: North, 
Northeast, Central-West, Southeast and South.  The Southern region of Brazil is 
composed by three states only – (from north to south) Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio 
Grande do Sul. Their capitals are, respectively: Curitiba, Florianopolis and Porto Alegre. 
                                                          
3 Values provided by Accor in € but converted to US$ at a rate of 1.3$/€ 
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Macro analysis 
Each region of Brazil is different and so a careful and focused analysis on the Southern 
region is necessary. To the effect, a PESTEL analysis was performed in order to 
understand the three states situation. 
Political 
Brazil has, in general, some political stability, having this one only being "reconsidered" 
by the population in a more severe way in 2013 through some significant protests. This 
discontentment came most likely from the country's economic growth slowdown, which 
result in several social issues (like unemployment). Another cause pointed was the 
expenditures with the future world events and the corruption involved in this question. 
As so, people demanded more transparency in order to fight the corruption. Nevertheless, 
considering the world's recovery from the global crisis, it is expected that Brazil will be 
able to restart its strong growth and so diminishing the dissents. 
Economical 
The South and South-Eastern region of Brazil are considerably more developed than any 
other regions in the country. This might be due to the concentration of the population in 
the area (see Exhibit 5, Figure 1). Two of the Southern States grew at a faster pace than 
the country’s annual GDP growth from ’95 to ’07, being Rio Grande do Sul the only one 
who couldn’t achieve such growth.  
Table 1 – Average Annual Growth of Brazil, the Southern Region and its States 
These States grew, in general, at a slower pace than most of the other states (see Exhibit 
6 for complete table) but this should be translated as the catch up of the remaining ones 
  Average Annual Growth in % from 95’ to 07’ 
Brazil 2.967 
South of Brazil 3.370 
   Paraná 3.528 
   Rio Grande Do Sul 2.438 
   Santa Catarina 4.146 
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and not a bad performance from the Southern region (see Exhibit 5, Figure 2). Also, the 
country’s economy is still quite based on the commodity sector while the Southern 
regions are already facing quite more the services sector. Nevertheless is in the South that 
still relies most of the country’s wealth (see Exhibit 5, Figure 3). 
Social 
The social development that took place in the last 20 years in Brazil was tremendous. The 
country passed from an overall poor HDI to a general quite good index, almost reaching 
the level of the developed economies' HDI. In fact, the South and Southeast region are 
the ones that evolved the most, being a great part of the municipalities above the country's 
average and 43 out of the 44 municipalities which are considered highly developed 
(HDI>0.8) are in the South and Southeast regionv. This translates that these regions have, 
on average, a quite good life expectancy, a low level of illiteracy and an elevated GDP 
per capita. 
Technological 
Brazil is considered the most developed country of Latin America in several technological 
areas. However, the most relevant for the case is definitely the communication sector. 
Brazil is quite developed in this particular matter in the Centre, South and Southeast 
regions, supporting all the modern network means, contrasting with the other regions. Is 
also the 5th country with more internet users in the worldvi. 
Environmental 
Concerning this issue, it is possible to say that Brazil is, at some level, an eco-friendly 
country. Its carbon emissions are quite low, especially when compared with other 
emerging economies (see Exhibit 5, Figure 4), and even the ones emitted are quite 
“consumed” by the vast territory still covered by forest (see Exhibit 5, Figure 5). Plus, 
the energy consumption in Brazil relies a lot on oil and hydroelectric power (47% and 
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35% respectively) and it’s the 2nd country which more biodiesel produces and usesvii. 
Considering all this data, it is possible to conclude that this country is, at least for the 
following years, relatively environmental sustainable. The weather in the three states of 
the South is humid subtropical, which means that the temperature in the summer is usually 
high and in the winter mild. The precipitation observed stays at a stable level all year, yet 
not much accentuated.viii 
Legal 
 The bureaucracy in Brazil is quite high and is considered one of the biggest barriers to 
the investment in the country, since it increases the corruption and makes the business 
activity slow and more costful. The taxes are also a concern for most investors since are 
usually quite high and complex. 
There are several laws to be taken into account, namely the ones involved in the process 
of opening an hotel (see Exhibit 8 for the relevant laws applicable to the hotel industry). 
Although these laws are one of the main bureaucratic problems that some investors point, 
VG should not have much trouble dealing with these since they are basically the same 
that the company had to pass through while creating the other hotels in the  country. About 
the taxes, there are two types that apply to the hotel business: the federal and the municipal 
(there are no statual taxes to apply to the hotel business directly). VG knows already all 
of them since they are the same all over the contry. The only different relies on the 
percentages taken by the municipes (the ISS, the ITBI and the IPTU) which might be 
different from the ones practiced where VG has already hotels.  
City Selection 
Considering the Macro analysis of the country with some specific focus in the Southern 
region and taking into consideration the characteristics of the Express hotel model, is 
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pertinent to define before any further analysis, which should be considered good cities in 
the region for the internationalization. Good indicators that should be considered are the 
city’s afflux of people and the investors’ opinion about those. These two analysis give us 
the reality and the prospects of the businesses development in the area.  
Tourist Afflux 
Based on the airport data provided by Infraero, the cities of Porto Alegre, Curitiba and 
Florianopolis had the 9th, the 10th and the 14th busiest airports in 2012, even though quite 
focused in domestic flights. Observing the table below (see Exhibit 9, Table 1 for a more 
detailed ranking), is possible to state that Porto Alegre and Curitiba had considerably 
more movement than Florianopolis, even though the last got more than 3.4 Million 
people. Another important factor to state is the substantial percentage of passengers that 
arrived from domestic flights (all of the three Southern airports got more than 90%), 
which probably indicates a large afflux of Brazilian people to this places.  
Table 2 – South of Brazil Airport Traffic in 2012 (Source: Infraero) 
Pos. Acronym City Domestic International Total Domestic % International % 
1 SBGR São Paulo 21,234,352 11,542,978 32,777,330 64.78% 35.22% 
9 SBPA Porto Alegre 7,606,507 654,848 8,261,355 92.07% 7.93% 
10 SBCT Curitiba 6,738,071 90,263 6,828,334 98.68% 1.32% 
14 SBFL Florianopolis 3,178,877 216,379 3,395,256 93.63% 6.37% 
Accordingly to Infraero, the three airports are currently operating under capacity (63%, 
87% and 83% respectively)ix. However, based on a report made by McKinsey and the 
BNDES in 2009, (see below Table 3 and Exhibit 9, Chart 1 for the airports’ evolution 
and forecasts), is possible to verify that the three Base prospects for 2014 were already 
surpassed in 2012. In fact, in Porto Alegre and Florianopolis, even the Optimistic 
forecasts for 2014 were surpassed already in 2012 and Curitiba was quite close to this 
value. 
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Table 3 – Airports’ Capacity and Prospects made in 2009 (Sources: Infraero and BNDES) 
 
Passengers 
in 2012 
Capacity 
Capacity 
Usage 
Prospects made in 2009 
2014 Pess. 2014 Base 2014 Opt. 2020 2030 
Porto Alegre 8,261,355 13,100,000 63% 6,300,000 7,200,000 8,100,000 9,700,000 15,800,000 
Curitiba 6,828,334 7,800,000 88% 5,400,000 6,200,000 7,000,000 8,400,000 13,800,000 
Florianopolis 3,395,256 4,177,800 81% 2,200,000 2,500,000 2,900,000 3,400,000 5,600,000 
Investors Perspective 
In a study conducted by EY in order to sound the investment in Brazil and to draw 
forecasts about it, Curitiba and Porto Alegre appeared in 3rd and 5th place at the list of 
Brazilian cities with more FDI in the last years, only surpassed by São Paulo, Rio de 
Janeiro (1st and 2nd) and Campinas (4th). Also in the same document, Curitiba was elected 
by several queried investors the most promising city of Brazil while Porto Alegre and 
Florianopolis stayed with the 4th and 10th place. (See Exhibit 10 for both rankings.) 
Taking into account all this, is reasonable to conduct the succeeding analysis bearing  in 
mind an internationalization for one or more of these three Southern capitals, since they 
are the most promising cities in the region. 
SWOT 
A SWOT analysis was assembled in order to retrieve a better perspective of the Pros and 
Cons of this expansion. 
Table 4 – SWOT Analysis for an Internationalization to the South of Brazil 
STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES 
 Knowledge of the Brazilian market, due 
to its 12 years of experience operating 
there; 
 Really patient and careful might slows 
down the process too much4; 
                                                          
4 E.g. Vila Galé Rio de Janeiro took about 10 years to start being built and if started earlier could probably 
profit more from the exponential growth in tourism seen in the last years in this hub. 
 THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF VILA GALÉ TO THE SOUTH OF BRAZIL 
11 
 
 An internationalization success history; 
 Really patient and careful, always to 
minimize the entry risks. VG has its own 
personnel looking for exactly what is 
considered an opportunity for the 
company in predefined areas of the 
globe; 
 Defined culture; 
 Strong brand in Brazil. 
 No experience in the type of Express 
hotels; 
 No partnerships in Brazil, even though 
VG says that hadn’t needed them so 
far; 
 No experience in the Southern states. 
 
OPPORTUNITIES THREATS 
 No HIE in the three cities of the South; 
 Strong development from the Southern 
cities, boosted by the economy of the 
neighbourhood cities of the Southeast 
(S. Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Campinas…) 
(see Exhibit 6 and 9); 
 Strong prospects on the eyes of the 
investors (see Exhibit 10); 
 The upcoming international events 
might boost the three Southern cities5; 
 Good location of the Southern States 
concerning Mercosur. 
 Already some Ibis hotels in each city: 
Curitiba has 4 (one close to the 
airport); Porto Alegre has 2 (also with 
one in the airport area) and 
Florianopolis has 1; 
 The current Brazilian economic 
slowdown might affect these cities 
growth on the eyes of the investors, 
even though that this impact can’t be 
too strong; 
 The issues that already averse the 
investors, such as the high corporate 
taxes, corruption or the security, might 
                                                          
5 Curitiba and Porto Alegre will have each one a stadium for the FIFA World Cup, and are quite closer to 
Rio de Janeiro than the northern cities concerning the Olympics of 2016 
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get worse due to the recent economic 
slowdown, diminishing investments in 
the country.  
TOWS 
The TOWS analysis is a complementary analysis derived from the SWOT analysis. Once 
knowing what do the company has in its favour and against, is important to realize what 
is possible to do in order to take advantage of the firm’s strengths relatively to the 
environment, while using these exterior pressures to diminish the weaknesses. 
The strong brand in the country and the knowledge of the Brazilian market are capabilities 
that should be used by VG both to rise entry barriers for future entrants (namely HIE) and 
to decrease the opening time. Regarding the entry, the group should not be too strict in 
what it considers an opportunity, since, due to the increasing development and good 
prospects in the three cities, it will certainly appear several good real estate opportunities, 
the cities will be thriving and VG should avoid to “regret” to open too late. Also, it is 
important to take advantage of the current absence of HIE, which releases some pressure 
of VG to be excellent right in the beginning and would allow the brand to benchmark 
purely the HIE methods. Furthermore, it is important to expand fast and to take a position 
before Ibis reinforces its strategies. Nevertheless, VG should remain especially careful in 
the location of its hotel in order to be a serious competitor to Ibis. 
The proximity of the other Mercosur countries gives the opportunity to study their 
markets and their clients, which goes along with VG careful growth strategy since it 
provides a chance of a deeper analysis of potential expansions to those territories. To open 
a different type of hotels and being in the South, would allow VG to fight better an 
eventual Brazilian economic downturn (and even the seasonality experienced by the 
 THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF VILA GALÉ TO THE SOUTH OF BRAZIL 
13 
 
Resorts in the Northeast). Plus, with its well-known brand and knowledge of the market, 
in the eventuality of a decrease in tourism numbers, VG would be able to relatively sustain 
its numbers. (See Exhibit 11 for detailed and schematic TOWS analysis) 
Hotel Concentration Analysis 
For the Hotel Concentration Analysis of each city, it was used the website “hoteis.com”, 
which is the most suitable hotel search engine for the purpose due to the available filters. 
As so, it was possible to locate in the map most of the hotels existent in each city, for any 
time (it is possible to eliminate the “date” factor from the search) and then filtering in 
order to obtain only business hotels. This analysis is relevant in the way that shows how 
other hotels are dispersed (and how they are focused in a particular area) and discloses 
the amount of potential competitors active in the hub. 
Curitiba 
In the capital of Paraná were identified 16 business hotels out of the total universe of 60 
pointed by the website. These 16 are dispersed in three areas: the city downtown, with 
11; the Batel neighbourhood, with 4; and, finally, Champagnat with only one. Also, 
looking in the Ibis and HI websites (these two brands are not included in the search 
engine), it was possible to verify that the first one has 3 hotels in the city centre and 1 
near the airport, while the second one has no hotels in the city. Therefore, 19 hotels can 
be pointed as probable competitors of a VGE in Curitiba. 
The best location for a business hotel should be near the business centres and is possible 
to state through this analysis that Curitiba’s financial area is located in the downtown and 
in the wealthy neighbourhood of Batel. In fact is not difficult to observe that the square 
kilometre with more business hotels in Curitiba is located between the centres of the two 
areas, comprising roughly 11 hotels. Batel is also known for being the zone where the 
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square meter price is higher, which probably justifies the lack of hotels in the area when 
comparing with the downtown. (See Exhibit 12, Figure 1 for the city’s map.) 
Porto Alegre 
This Southern city has a relatively more dispersed disposition of business hotels than 
Curitiba. The search engine was able to identify 12 hotels of this kind in the city, showing 
two predominant areas: the city centre and Moinhos de Vento, comprising 7 hotels. Ibis 
has also hotels in this city, presenting one in Moinhos de Vento and another near the 
airport. There are two other hotels under the brand Ibis in the two satellite cities of Canoas 
and Novo Hamburgo, but both are relatively distant from the city centre. On the other 
hand, HI has no Express hotels in the city. 
Through this analysis is possible to state that, even being some business hotels in what is 
considered the city centre, they are all quite close of the Moinhos de Vento area, which is 
where the biggest concentration of business hotels is. (See Exhibit 12, Figure 2 for the 
city’s map) 
Florianopolis 
The capital of Santa Catarina has a quite large hotel industry. However, the number of 
business hotels is not so promising. A total of 7 of this kind were pointed by the search 
engine and Ibis has two hotels in the area, being one of them in the city centre and the 
other one in the satellite city (but still relatively close from the centre of Florianopolis) of 
São José. It is possible to state through this analysis that the biggest concentration of 
business hotels, including one Ibis, is in Florianopolis’ downtown, having the total of 4 
hotels considered business hotels. (See Exhibit 12, Figure 3 for the city’s map) 
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International Analysis Conclusion 
Taking into account the information disposable on the section “City Selection”, it is 
possible to conclude that there is a greater afflux of people to Curitiba and Porto Alegre 
than to Florianopolis, even though this gap is decreasing. Nevertheless, regarding the 
other source provided in that section, the EY report, there’s a clear preference and stronger 
prospects from the investors on the capitals of Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul than on the 
Santa Catarina’s. Additionally, is possible to conclude, also through the analysis of the 
hotel concentration, that Curitiba and Porto Alegre are considerably more directed to 
business tourism than Florianopolis, which provides so few business type hotels. This 
location is far more directed to other type of tourism and so I believe an entrance in a 
close future at this location could be considered using a City/Leisure Hotel or even a 
Resort in the area, but not an Express. 
Also, considering only Curitiba and Porto Alegre and running the same analytical process 
as above, it is possible to observe a greater business development and prospects in the 
first city. This is probably due to its proximity to São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. 
Nevertheless, Porto Alegre also shows reasonably good values on these analysed issues. 
As so, I believe that, so far, the best International strategy for VG would be to focus 
mostly on Curitiba and Porto Alegre, concerning Express hotels in the South of Brazil. 
One might say that Curitiba has already a developed competition regarding this market 
comparing to Porto Alegre, but facing the growth forecasts and the high investment 
prospects for the Paraná capital, I believe that the current lodging available of this type 
will not be enough in a near future. In the end, my opinion is that Florianopolis should 
only be considered for this type of hotel in a more advanced stage, i.e. after a successful 
expansion to the other two capitals and after a reassessment of this town at the time.  
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INTERNATIONALIZATION 
Entry Mode 
VG has a relatively strict way of expansion. The group prefers to rely on Greenfields 
through the purchase of terrains and buildings or on Acquisitions of existent hotels. In the 
end, the company likes to rule completely the propriety on its own. This should be 
considered the most likely entry mode in the South – to find a land/building/hotel in the 
predefined areas established before in this document and take over it alone. The 
advantages of these two strategies are the full control over the hotel, the possibility to 
decide what to do with the propriety at any time and the option to impose freely the culture 
wanted. On the other hand, these are probably the international strategies which more 
resources (namely capital) and time consumes, even though Greenfield weights more on 
the time while the Acquisition process is more capital intensive. Also, for a non-
experienced company in the destiny market, to acknowledge all the laws and procedures 
necessaries in the country might be another delay provoked by these strategies. However, 
VG wouldn’t be so affected by this last condition, considering that it is already present in 
Brazil and has experience dealing with this. 
Another option would be an internationalization through Management Contracts. This 
strategy is not so well perceived by the group and has risen some issues before. Even 
though it would be cheaper, safer and faster, VG’s profits would probably be much lower, 
the control over the propriety would be limited and the sub-brand could be questioned. 
An even bigger issue would be to find a hotel in such a prosperous cities like Curitiba or 
Porto Alegre willing to accept such contract right away. VG could acquire a 
land/propriety, turn it into the desired hotel, sell it to an investor and then settle a MC, but 
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this way it would still be capital intensive in the short term and not faster than a Greenfield 
or Acquisition. As so, I don’t believe this would be a good option for this expansion. 
A third strategy would be a Joint Venture with a Brazilian hotel chain with a strong 
connections in the South. This would reduce the capital required and could turn the 
process faster. However, in the end, VG would only have a share of the brand control and 
its management, which could lead to disagreements in the long run. Plus, the company, 
through its history, has never shown interest into share the control over its hotels, even 
though it has currently two proprieties of the portfolio under MC. 
Other entry strategies aren’t any better: for Franchising and Licensing, VGE needed to 
be an already well-known and successful brand, and Exporting doesn’t apply to this type 
of market. 
As so, I believe, considering all this, that VG should option then for its usual expansion 
strategy, also where it has more experience, and acquire a land/building/hotel in the 
desirable area. 
Financial Analysis 
In order to verify the project’s profitability, it is necessary to make some financial 
analysis, discounting FCF based on some assumptions. This analysis tries to be as precise 
as possible, although it may present, when implementing, some forecasting errors. To 
minimize it, the assumptions used tried to be meaningful and a considerable amount of 
scenarios with several variables were computed. The project was composed based on 
variable sources, being the two major ones an interview with Gonçalo Rebelo de Almeida 
and a spreadsheet model used by VG ceded by him. Also, the project was estimated for 
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30 years, instead of for infinite periods, since even in this horizon the forecasts are already 
quite uncertain and more years could prejudice even more the analysis. 
Even though the benchmark model created for the FCF calculation is the Appendices, 
some points are necessary to clarify. Regarding employees, the average amount of 
personnel working in a VG hotel with 200 bedrooms that is assumed is 69 people.6 Since 
this number applies to larger and with more amenities hotels than the Express, it is not 
reasonable to calculate the employees necessary for a VGE using a merely proportion. As 
so, when considering the Lodging area (where in the model 32 out of the 69 employees 
work) on a 120 bedrooms hotel (benchmark size of a VGE), it should rely proportionally 
on 19 or 20 employees. However, due to the considerable less amenities, for this area it 
was presumed 10 employees. The F&B area has in the model 30 employees working 
(which indicates a proportional number of 18 for a 120 bedrooms’ hotel), but for an 
Express hotel, where only Breakfasts and some snacks are served, only 8 employees were 
considered for the purpose. Relatively to the Administration and Maintenance, where in 
the initial model are 4 and 3 employees working, the numbers assumed for the VGE were 
merely the proportional numbers for a 120 rooms’ hotel, which are 3 and 2. The salaries 
are based on the disclosed information provided in the model spreadsheet ceded, except 
the ones in F&B, where, since they don’t need to be so specialized, their cost should be 
lower.7 
The VGE’s revenues come from two activities: the first are the Lodging services, which 
come from room price per night, and the second one come from F&B services, namely 
the purchase of snacks (breakfasts are not considered since they are included in the room 
                                                          
6 Information on the Model Spreadsheet disclosed by Gonçalo Rebelo de Almeida 
7 The number of employees weren’t altered any other time in any of the scenarios. 
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price). Regarding the costs, the percentages used for accounts like “Other Costs” or others 
more specific (e.g. Energy) were provided by VG and not changed. 
The investment was computed based on the average investment made by VG in its hotels. 
Having the Total Investment per room, and separating the amount that is spent in rooms’ 
equipment and furniture, it was possible to calculate the Investment per square meter 
without rooms’ equipment and furniture. Assuming a new reduced value for the rooms’ 
equipment (VG’s normal rooms have kitchenettes, furniture and decorations that 
wouldn’t be necessary in an Express hotel) and adding it to the Investment per square 
meter previously computed it was possible to assemble a Total Investment value per 
square meter, and so the Investment value per room, and consequently the Total 
Investment to be applied to the VGE. The percentages of the Total Investment applied to 
separate the land, building and equipment costs, as also their expected lifetime (and 
consequently their depreciation) were provided by VG. Also, the group is not “taking 
out” the money generated currently in Brazil and so, to invest this money overflow could 
be a good solution. In the end, a loan will not be considered since the group has enough 
money relatively stopped in the country that could be used for the necessary investment. 
For Curitiba, considering the expected OR for Economy Scale hotels of 72%x and 
assuming a 30 years project, as well a cost of equity of 10%8, it is observed a negative 
NPV with a Profitability Index of 0.83. These two factors give a red light to the investment 
as it is in the Benchmark form, even though almost every year the hotel makes practically 
€1M and, if the FCF are not actualized, the investment is recovered between the 10th and 
the 11th year, respecting the company’s requirements9 for a project. 
                                                          
8 Value provided by VG 
9 Expected investment recovery between 12 and 15 years 
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Some scenarios were developed in order to verify how a VGE in Curitiba could be 
profitable. It was concluded that the NPV was positive if the Investment per square meter 
without the rooms’ equipment and furniture decreased from the benchmarked value of 
€3,200 to €2,300 or, more realistic, when this value per square meter decreased to €2,600 
while the amount of rooms increased to 160 instead of 120, ceteris paribus. Also, when 
solely increasing the price per room (tested until €70 per night) or increasing the OR 
(tested until 80%) the NPV would still be negative. Even when considering both moving 
at the same time with a negative correlation (the only one that makes economic sense), a 
positive indicator wasn’t achieved. In opposition to this Curitiba’s scenarios, Porto Alegre 
has higher OR prospects and the competitors (namely Ibis) practice higher prices, leading 
to a benchmark with a positive NPV, even though with a low PI of 1.037. The best option 
for this city is the same as in Curitiba, to decrease the investment without equipment and 
furniture to €2,600 and increasing the room number to 160, ceteris paribus, returning this 
way a PI of 1.28. (See Exhibit 13 for the OR prospects used for both cities and Exhibit 
14 for more detailed financial information.) 
Implementation 
Marketing Mix 
For the implementation process, it should be considered the 4P’s that compose the MM, 
accordingly to McCarthy’s formulation: Product, Place, Promotion and Price. The first 
two points were already pointed out before in this document, being the Product an 
Express type hotel with the characteristics said previously10 and the Place in Curitiba 
between the city’s downtown and the Batel neighbourhood11 and in Porto Alegre 
                                                          
10 See “Vila Galé Express” section 
11 see Hotel Concentration Analysis and International Analysis Conclusion sections 
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somewhere relatively close to Moinhos de Vento. However, the other two points of the 
MM are not yet quite defined. 
Regarding Promotion, VGE advertising strategy can be based only on three marketing 
campaigns. The first one, quite simple and low cost, is to advertise the new hotels on the 
group website, as well as in the social networks which VG is in. Three months before the 
opening should be enough to create some awareness and come up with some reservations. 
Equally important is to certify that the new hotel is added to hotels’ search engine, like 
booking.com. Most people rely on these kind of websites not only to make a reservation 
but to read other people’s comments about the hotel. VG says that reservations on its 
portfolio are usually made through three channels12: directly (telephone or email), online 
(including company website) or through touristic agencies/operators. Concerning VGE, 
the firm shouldn’t expect reservations using the last channel, and can expect a quite larger 
weight on online reservations. As so, the VGE has to be present in these type of sites also 
at least three months before the opening. These two strategies should be kept, of course, 
even after the opening to continue to create brand awareness. 
A last advertising strategy that VG should rely on is publicity in crowded arrival places, 
namely the city airport, train stations and on highways. This aims business people 
entering in the city without a defined place to stay. Also, the first two places pointed have 
normally internet access, which would able potential customers to make a quick 
reservation as soon as they arrive in town. Since these billboards aim people arriving, it 
doesn’t make sense to advertise this way much sooner than the opening date. As so, I 
believe the best strategy is to start this publicity around one month before to target people 
                                                          
12 Information given in an interview with VG’s administrator Gonçalo Rebelo de Almeida 
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that go often to the city and keep it strongly in the first operating months. After that, this 
type of publicity should be maintained but in less intensity. In other words, in the most 
successfully strategic places, increasing the advertising efficiency. These promotions are 
applicable, of course, to both cities. 
The Price strategy for this hotel is relatively complicated to define. First of all, it should 
be considered the direct competitor prices, Ibis, in the places where VGE should be. 
Considering prices of the two Ibis hotels in the centre of Curitiba, Ibis Curitiba Shopping 
and Ibis Curitiba Batel, is possible to verify an Average Daily Price for 2014 of €53.62 
and €58.73 respectively (see Exhibit 15 for Ibis’ prices). This represents an average of 
€56.17 of daily price during 2014 for both hotels in the area. I believe that, since VG 
doesn’t know perfectly the Express market yet and has only one direct competitor in the 
city (even though are two hotels), it shouldn’t threat Ibis with a price war. On the other 
hand, to practice considerably higher prices than Ibis can perpetuate the most criticized 
characteristic of the group’s hotels, the Value-for-Money. In the end an Average Daily 
Price should fluctuate more or less between €50 and €60, taking advantage of the high 
and low seasons. Another aspect that VGE could take advantage of is from the demand 
fluctuations within the week period: there’s a higher demand for this type of hotel from 
Monday to Friday (working days) than on weekends, derived from the fact that businesses 
are mostly made on week days and so slightly higher prices could be presented at these 
days other than on Saturdays and Sundays. 
In Porto Alegre, for the Price strategy should also be considered the Ibis’ prices as a 
reference. The Ibis Porto Alegre Moinhos do Vento will practice an Average Daily Price 
of €66.8 in 2014 (see Exhibit 15, for Ibis’ prices) and so a VGE in this city should have 
a price fluctuating around this value for the same reasons pointed for Curitiba. 
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Implementation Phases 
Figure 1 – Implementation Chart (simplified) 
As a first phase of implementation is necessary to complete the most important research 
for VG: to find a good land/building/hotel that would fit in the profile of a good 
opportunity. To find a proper propriety that would suit all the requirements is the number 
one task that will define the whole implementation process. Only after this is possible to 
set all the rest. This process can take an undefined amount of time, since VG will only 
move in the presence of a good investment and that might take a while to appear (e.g. in 
Rio de Janeiro this opportunity appeared only 10 years after VG had shown interest in the 
area). 
Once the ideal building/land is found, the whole process is triggered. First of all, it is 
important to close the deal with the owner which might be relatively difficult, since the 
seller will probably have the upper hand regarding this business due to the fact that is 
should be quite complicated to find another real estate opportunity in the area. As so, it is 
expected something around three months of negotiations. Further on, VG must proceed 
to the hotel registration13. Though, to obtain this registration is necessary a construction 
licence and a construction conclusion certificate. Hence, is necessary a construction 
                                                          
13 See Legal section at PESTEL Analysis and Exhibit 8 (Applicable Laws). 
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project (which wouldn’t be too extensive if a proper building is bought) in order to obtain 
a construction permit. This would subsequently lead to the construction works, and only 
after it, VG would be able to register its hotel. All this process would take probably around 
one year and a half. 
The human resources also work in this pre-opening phase, first assessing job 
requirements, which should not be too time consuming and can be done immediately after 
the construction project is settled, and then recruiting and training mostly Brazilian 
workers for the defined positions14 that should take slightly more than half year. This last 
task from the HR should be performed taking into account the forecasted opening day in 
order to complete the trainees close to this date. Plus, after the opening, regular trainee 
should take place in the way to keep always improving, as VG usually does. 
For the opening time is necessary to consider the marketing campaigns (already expressed 
above at the MM section). This would start 3 months before the opening in order to tease 
and create some reservations for the first days. Of course these advertising measures 
should continue even after the opening day, with a special focus on the first months. After 
those, and in order to decrease marketing expenditures, the advertisements should reduce 
their presence, keeping only some crucial locations. 
Besides the continuous training and advertisement, after the opening day the control 
processes would take place almost constantly, checking regularly the key indicators, such 
as RevPAR, ADR and OR. Plus, to spot trainee needs, fill gaps in the personnel and 
benchmark Ibis should be ongoing processes in order to be always up-to-date for quick 
responses or strategy changes. (See Exhibit 16 for detailed Implementation Chart.) 
                                                          
14 VG contracts mostly Brazilian workers in Brazil in order to better adjust the culture to the clients. 
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FINAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on all the analysis elaborated above it was possible to conclude, at a certain point, 
that VG should only focus on two cities of the Southern states: Curitiba and Porto Alegre, 
presenting the first city better prospects concerning economic and financial development, 
while the second one presents a superior position today, with more touristic traffic and 
less competition in the business hotels submarket. However, when elaborating an 
internationalization process, it was possible to verify through a financial analysis that the 
position of Curitiba was considerably worse than Porto Alegre’s, mostly due to the fact 
that an Express hotel in this Paraná city would have to practice lower prices (consequence 
of a tight pressure of Ibis) and the OR prospects (even being quite high) are not as positive 
as the ones for Porto Alegre. The analysis has also shown a possibility of a good 
investment in Curitiba depending on the Investment cost: if the Investment is 
considerably lower than the one benchmarked in this document, then a VGE in Paraná 
could be a reality. Since the initial investment value was computed using data provided 
by VG referring to hotels with a considerable amount of common amenities (e.g. pools, 
spas), the “investment cost per room without equipment” is probably overvalued. As so, 
to be able to succeed in both cities, VG has to decrease the Investment cost considerably 
from the benchmarked here, not only in Curitiba, but also in Porto Alegre, where the 
initial position provides a, even though positive, quite low NPV. Yet, if VG takes too long 
to enter (too cautious), others might reinforce their position or even enter in the city (HIE), 
while entering in the wrong “street” might condemn a VGE right from the start. 
In the end, I believe that or the opportunity is spotted in the right place in the short term, 
with a cost considerably lower than the one benchmarked, or VG shouldn’t move to these 
places using VGE. All relies on the ability (and luck) of VG to find that good opportunity.  
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EXHIBIT 1   Company Portfolio 
 
Hotel Area/State Rooms 
Portugal 
Albacora Alentejo and Algarve 162 
Ampalius Alentejo and Algarve 357 
Atlântico Alentejo and Algarve 220 
Cascais Lisbon Coast 233 
Cerro Alagoa Alentejo and Algarve 310 
Clube de Campo Alentejo and Algarve 81 
Coimbra Centre 229 
Collection Palácio dos Arcos Lisbon Coast 76 
Ericeira Lisbon Coast 202 
Estoril Lisbon Coast 126 
Lagos Alentejo and Algarve  
Marina Alentejo and Algarve 243 
Náutico – All Inclusive Alentejo and Algarve 225 
Ópera Lisbon Coast 259 
Porto Porto 292 
Praia Alentejo and Algarve 40 
Santa Cruz Alentejo and Algarve 262 
Tavira Alentejo and Algarve 268 
Brasil 
Cumbuco Ceará 465 
Eco Resort de Angra – All Inclusive Rio de Janeiro 307 
Eco Resort do Cabo Pernambuco 300 
Fortaleza Ceará 300 
Marés Bahia 447 
Salvador Bahia 224 
Source: Vila Galé 
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EXHIBIT 2   Organizational Chart 
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EXHIBIT 3   booking.com Scorecard 
 
 CLEAN COMFORT LOCATION FACILITIES STAFF 
VALUE FOR 
MONEY TOTAL 
PORTUGAL 
Porto 8.3 8 7.3 8 8 7.8 7.9 
Santa Cruz 8.7 8.1 8 8.4 8.6 7.6 8.2 
Ericeira 8.4 8.2 9.6 8.1 8.5 7.6 8.4 
Nautico All Inclusive 6.7 7.1 7.6 7.1 8.8 6.8 7.4 
Praia 9.1 9 9.1 8.9 9.6 8.5 9.0 
Atlantico 6.9 6.9 8.2 7 7.5 6.7 7.2 
Cerro Alagoa 8.4 7.9 8.4 7.9 8.2 7.4 8.0 
Coimbra 8.9 8.7 7.8 8.5 8.6 8.2 8.5 
Marina 7.9 7.4 9.2 7.2 7.8 7.1 7.8 
Tavira 8.3 7.9 8.7 8 8.3 7.7 8.2 
Lagos 8.6 8.6 8.4 8.6 8.6 8 8.5 
Albacora 8 7.4 8.5 7.7 8 7.3 7.8 
Amapalius 8 7.6 9.5 7.6 7.9 7.4 8.0 
Opera 8.1 7.5 7.3 7.4 7.7 7.1 7.5 
Cascais 8.1 8.2 8.6 7.7 8.1 7.5 8.0 
Clube de Campo 7.2 6.7 8.2 7.1 8 6.8 7.3 
Estoril 8.3 7.5 9 7.3 8.4 7.3 8.0 
Collection Palácio dos Arcos 9.5 9.6 8.1 9.5 9.4 9 9.2 
PORTUGUESE  AVERAGE 8.2 7.9 8.4 7.9 8.3 7.5 8.0 
BRAZIL 
Marés All Inclusive 7.3 8.3 8.9 7.8 7.1 6.8 7.7 
Eco Resort Angra All 
Inclusive 
6.7 7.9 8.4 7.4 7.1 6.9 7.4 
Fortaleza 6.4 6.8 6.7 6.1 6.3 5.9 6.4 
Cumbuco All Inclusive 7.7 8.6 7.9 8.3 7.9 7.6 8.0 
Salvador 8 8.2 8.2 7.3 7.4 7.3 7.7 
Eco Resort do Cabo All 
Inclusive 
7.5 7.9 7.3 7.6 7.7 6.9 7.5 
BRAZILIAN AVERAGE 7.3 8.0 7.9 7.4 7.3 6.9 7.4 
Source: www.booking.com  
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EXHIBIT 4   VG Internal Survey 
 
  
HOTEIS 
SIMPATIA SERVIÇO 
LIMPEZA 
recep andar resta bares manut Sub-Total recep andar resta bares manut Sub-Total 
ALBACORA 88.35% 82.27% 82.95% 81.79% 82% 86.6% 78.64% 79.58% 78.83% 79.57% 80.75% 75.28% 75% 
AMPALIUS 84.9% 83.76% 83.33% 81.65% 81.97% 83.86% 79.79% 81.35% 80.66% 79.72% 81.37% 79.81% 78.42% 
ATLANTICO 85.4% 82.65% 82.59% 81.43% 79.48% 84.49% 77.23% 81.8% 80.1% 75.69% 78.65% 77.16% 78.3% 
CASCAIS 87.19% 85.83% 82.55% 86.45% 83.6% 87.44% 84.06% 81.02% 84.68% 83.09% 85.26% 85.04% 74.64% 
CERRO ALAGOA 87.53% 88.48% 85.1% 81.68% 82.94% 87.65% 87.38% 84.39% 79.54% 82.17% 87.22% 83.84% 78.48% 
CLUBE DE CAMPO 88.48% 85.94% 88.29% 87.17% 84.11% 87.3% 81.88% 83.93% 83.8% 79.77% 82.66% 79.74% 80.2% 
COIMBRA 90.65% 89.61% 88.09% 87.97% 87.75% 89.59% 88.16% 87.25% 86.71% 86.87% 89.42% 88.12% 83.02% 
COLLECTION PALACIO DOS ARCOS 98.25% 96.59% 94.43% 94.34% 96.7% 97.95% 96.53% 93.7% 93.15% 96.21% 96.95% 96.86% 89.38% 
CUMBUCO 83.12% 87.59% 86.77% 84.91% 86.79% 81.35% 82.03% 83.71% 83.55% 84.31% 83.29% 88.85% 83.66% 
ECO RESORT DE ANGRA 85.16% 79.33% 79.22% 77.42% 73.21% 83.08% 72.59% 78.63% 77.11% 66.54% 70.97% 82.48% 79.85% 
ECO RESORT DO CABO 81.81% 83.67% 80.52% 79.84% 79.93% 81.04% 76.91% 77.68% 75.87% 74.39% 74.88% 82.02% 79.48% 
ERICEIRA 89.5% 89.76% 88.25% 84.53% 83.36% 87.82% 88.27% 86.13% 83.12% 81.34% 88.62% 81.97% 83.65% 
ESTORIL 88.4% 86.9% 87.19% 85.46% 83.17% 88.22% 85.48% 85.96% 85.04% 81.89% 85.87% 81.27% 81.81% 
FORTALEZA 81.65% 81.15% 78.06% 76.84% 73.17% 79.49% 77.01% 75.53% 73.81% 68.91% 76.5% 78.46% 76.68% 
LAGOS 89.66% 88.89% 89.15% 85.62% 86.82% 88.77% 86.74% 87.31% 85.06% 86.14% 87.77% 87.72% 82.28% 
MARES 84.86% 86.63% 83.7% 84.81% 82.93% 83.11% 83.15% 81.51% 82.85% 79.56% 83.08% 85.45% 82.09% 
MARINA 85.6% 85.44% 81.55% 81.8% 82.72% 84.76% 83.09% 81.12% 80.85% 79.87% 83.61% 80.69% 76.52% 
NAUTICO 94.22% 88.22% 90.21% 89.81% 88.17% 92.83% 85.65% 88% 88.48% 86.46% 85.13% 85.42% 86.49% 
OPERA 85.05% 85.86% 82.02% 82.25% 81.48% 84.69% 84.06% 81.11% 81.52% 79.59% 84.45% 78.82% 79.22% 
PORTO 88.33% 88.22% 88.72% 85.54% 86.5% 88.18% 87.44% 87.74% 84.69% 84.39% 87.83% 83.23% 85.37% 
PRAIA 96.86% 92.97% 92.98% 91.96% 90.92% 96.03% 92.27% 91.11% 90.05% 89.62% 92.95% 92.32% 86.46% 
SALVADOR 80.71% 87.21% 80.34% 82.77% 78.8% 82.14% 85.52% 78.45% 79.5% 76.3% 85.95% 86.81% 80.81% 
SANTA CRUZ 90.35% 90.32% 90.04% 87.4% 88.36% 90.13% 89.88% 87.89% 85.66% 87.79% 90.81% 87.29% 81.88% 
TAVIRA 86.38% 85.5% 81.69% 80.1% 80.33% 85.77% 83.32% 79.91% 78.23% 77.04% 83.05% 78.39% 73.97% 
Media 87,19% 86.69% 85.3% 83.85% 83.28% 85.66% 86.15% 83.82% 83.35% 82.08% 80.65% 83.36% 84.23% 
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HOTEIS 
CONFO
RTO 
COMIDA PRÁTICAS 
AMBIENT
AIS 
VOLTAR
IA 
RECOM
ENDARI
A 
Como chegou ao hotel 
TOTAL q. 
alm/jant 
v. 
alm/jant 
q. peq 
alm 
v. peq 
alm 
agência interne
t 
publicida
de 
recomend
ação 
ALBACORA 72.46% 83.35% 81.25% 84.45% 93.65% 93.79% 12.01% 46.79% 11.03% 30.18% 170 465 82.6 
AMPALIUS 75.78% 82.25% 81.22% 78.36% 92.94% 92.82% 20.95% 41.55% 9.8% 27.7% 138 390 82.75 
ATLANTICO 75.83% 84.07% 81.37% 74.05% 92.59% 92.26% 18.42% 38.6% 12.78% 30.2% 102 241 81.72 
CASCAIS 73.5% 81.71% 80.56% 80.47% 93.03% 93.94% 31.36% 41.78% 8.92% 17.93% 107 215 84.52 
CERRO ALAGOA 76.03% 85.22% 83.15% 82.07% 92.75% 94.44% 39.93% 38.1% 6.8% 15.18% 130 290 85.28 
CLUBE DE CAMPO 76.14% 86.51% 83.53% 84.67% 96.76% 96.88% 8.82% 35.01% 14.48% 41.69% 115 331 85.36 
COIMBRA 81.04% 87.51% 86.64% 83.39% 97.03% 97.01% 14.68% 38.94% 16.52% 29.86% 333 602 88.79 
COLLECTION PALACIO DOS ARCOS 87.14% 90.24% 85.85% 92.74% 99.56% 99.67% 9.33% 48.41% 10.86% 31.4% 92 266 94.98 
CUMBUCO 82.77% 87.19% 85.48% 82.76% 90.81% 91.78% 39% 30.29% 4.56% 26.15% 155 889 85.33 
ECO RESORT DE ANGRA 79.31% 80.7% 79.47% 68.03% 84.46% 84.04% 29.17% 29.1% 4.98% 36.74% 75 553 78.02 
ECO RESORT DO CABO 76.96% 83.47% 80.51% 94.64% 82.52% 82.65% 42.57% 28.29% 2.48% 26.66% 35 377 79.67 
ERICEIRA 82.82% 86.15% 83.91% 81.27% 97.5% 97.62% 37.67% 25.24% 13.32% 23.77% 209 373 87.15 
ESTORIL 79.41% 85.32% 82.91% 79.58% 93.98% 94.56% 30.86% 34.89% 12.95% 21.3% 183 301 85.89 
FORTALEZA 74.54% 81.64% 80.11% 71.05% 80.43% 79.63% 53.96% 26.11% 4.07% 15.87% 105 409 77.48 
LAGOS 80.51% 86.15% 83.28% 83.43% 96.07% 97.32% 34.72% 33.19% 13.23% 18.86% 336 479 87.51 
MARES 82.91% 82.49% 81.49% 85.9% 92.49% 92.53% 44.88% 19.94% 4.32% 30.86% 172 1229 84.3 
MARINA 74.69% 80.17% 80.78% 79.88% 90.59% 90.33% 25.21% 42.38% 9.84% 22.57% 82 188 82.69 
NAUTICO 84.64% 87.36% 85.31% 82.54% 92.5% 94.99% 51.16% 31.92% 3.96% 12.96% 58 190 88.26 
OPERA 77.09% 81.73% 80.63% 77.94% 90.43% 90.31% 22.61% 35.89% 12.29% 29.21% 149 354 83.07 
PORTO 84.46% 86.83% 85.51% 80.58% 95.44% 96.35% 50.58% 21.35% 9.79% 18.28% 271 506 87.5 
PRAIA 80.4% 89.65% 87.17% 89.16% 98.72% 99.4% 11.88% 62.28% 7.98% 17.86% 80 179 92 
SALVADOR 77.62% 83.64% 80.68% 74.64% 92.05% 89.38% 52.82% 28.39% 3.13% 15.66% 15 75 82.83 
SANTA CRUZ 78.45% 84.18% 81.15% 83.45% 93.2% 95.58% 40.91% 30.73% 9.88% 18.48% 295 552 87.85 
TAVIRA 72.41% 82.89% 81.9% 78.59% 93.38% 94% 18.35% 46.83% 10.98% 23.84% 296 643 82.71 
Media 83.79% 81.08% 79.45% 84.53% 82.68% 81.65% 92.3% 92.85% 39.29% 36.04% 10.49% 25.66% 84.74% 
 
Source: Vila Galé (from January to October 2013; Total surveys made: 43,020; Sample’s Percentage: 14.20% 
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EXHIBIT 5   Regional Maps 
Source: OECD iLibrary – OECD Regions at a Glance 
Figure 1 Distribution of Population (inhabitants per 
Square Kilometer) 
Figure 2 Regional contribution to GDP growth from 
’95 to ’07 (average annual rate at constant 2000 
USD) 
Figure 3 Regional Economic Disparities (GDP per 
capita, constant 2000 USD in thousands) 
Figure 4 Carbon Emissions and Air Quality 
(population exposures to air pollution, by 
WHOPM2.5 thresholds) 
Figure 5 Forest and Carbon Footprints (carbon 
absorption through biomass production) 
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EXHIBIT 6   Brazilian and Regional’s growth 
 
Brazil’s growth from 95’ to 07’ (in percentage). Average Annual Growth: 2.97% 
 95' 96' 97' 98' 99' 00' 01' 02' 03' 04' 05' 06' 07' 
Annual Growth  4.42 2.15 3.37 0.04 0.26 4.31 1.31 2.66 1.15 5.71 3.16 3.96 6.10 
Source: World Bank 
Region State Average Annual GDP Growth Rate from 95’ to 07’ (%) 
North 
Acre 4.80 
Amapá 3.48 
Amazonas 3.85 
Pará 4.51 
Rondônia 5.04 
Roraima 3.81 
Tocantins 7.08 
Northern Region Average 4.65 
Northeast 
Alagoas 3.09 
Bahia 3.80 
Ceará 2.73 
Maranhão 5.33 
Paraíba 4.08 
Pernambuco 3.13 
Piauí 3.36 
Rio Grande Do Norte 4.77 
Sergipe 4.33 
North-Eastern Region Average 3.85 
Southeast 
Espírito Santo 4.09 
Minas Gerais 3.40 
Rio De Janeiro 2.95 
São Paulo 2.16 
South-Eastern Region Average 3.15 
South 
Paraná 3.53 
Rio Grande Do Sul 2.44 
Santa Catarina 4.15 
Southern Region Average 3.37 
Central West 
Distrito Federal 1.61 
Goiás 4.52 
Mato Grosso 6.79 
Mato Grosso Do Sul 4.26 
Central-Western Region Average 4.29 
Source: OECD  
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EXHIBIT 7   HDI 
 
 
Source: “O Índice do Desenvolvimento Humano Municipal Brasileiro 
EXHIBIT 8   Laws Applicable to the Hotel Business in Brazil 
Transcript from Lei Geral do Turismo 
Art. 22. Os prestadores de serviços turísticos estão obrigados ao cadastro no 
Ministério do Turismo, na forma e nas condições fixadas nesta Lei e na sua 
regulamentação. 
Art. 23. Consideram-se meios de hospedagem os empreendimentos ou 
estabelecimentos, independentemente de sua forma de constituição, destinados a 
prestar serviços de alojamento temporário, ofertados em unidades de freqüência 
individual e de uso exclusivo do hóspede, bem como outros serviços necessários 
aos usuários, denominados de serviços de hospedagem, mediante adoção de 
instrumento contratual, tácito ou expresso, e cobrança de diária. 
§ 1 Os empreendimentos ou estabelecimentos de hospedagem que explorem ou 
administrem, em condomínios residenciais, a prestação de serviços de hospedagem 
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em unidades mobiliadas e equipadas, bem como outros serviços oferecidos a 
hóspedes, estão sujeitos ao cadastro de que trata esta Lei e ao seu regulamento. 
Art. 24. Os meios de hospedagem, para obter o cadastramento, devem preencher 
pelo menos um dos seguintes requisitos: 
I - possuir licença de funcionamento, expedida pela autoridade competente, para 
prestar serviços de hospedagem, podendo tal licença objetivar somente partes da 
edificação; e 
II - no caso dos empreendimentos ou estabelecimentos conhecidos como 
condomínio hoteleiro, flat, flat-hotel, hotel-residence, loft, apart-hotel, apart-
service condominial, condohotel e similares, possuir licença edilícia de construção 
ou certificado de conclusão de construção, expedidos pela autoridade competente, 
acompanhados dos seguintes documentos: 
a) convenção de condomínio ou memorial de incorporação ou, ainda, instrumento 
de instituição condominial, com previsão de prestação de serviços hoteleiros aos 
seus usuários, condôminos ou não, com oferta de alojamento temporário para 
hóspedes mediante contrato de hospedagem no sistema associativo, também 
conhecido como pool de locação; 
b) documento ou contrato de formalização de constituição do pool de locação, como 
sociedade em conta de participação, ou outra forma legal de constituição, com a 
adesão dos proprietários de pelo menos 60% (sessenta por cento) das unidades 
habitacionais à exploração hoteleira do empreendimento; 
c) contrato em que esteja formalizada a administração ou exploração, em regime 
solidário, do empreendimento imobiliário como meio de hospedagem de 
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responsabilidade de prestador de serviço hoteleiro cadastrado no Ministério do 
Turismo; 
d) certidão de cumprimento às regras de segurança contra riscos aplicáveis aos 
estabelecimentos comerciais; e 
e) documento comprobatório de enquadramento sindical da categoria na atividade 
de hotéis, exigível a contar da data de eficácia do segundo dissídio coletivo 
celebrado na vigência desta Lei. 
Art. 26. Os meios de hospedagem deverão fornecer ao Ministério do Turismo, em 
periodicidade por ele determinada, as seguintes informações: 
I - perfil dos hóspedes recebidos, distinguindo-os por nacionalidade; e 
II - registro quantitativo de hóspedes, taxas de ocupação, permanência média e 
número de hóspedes por unidade habitacional. 
EXHIBIT 9   Airport Information 
 
Table 1 – Passengers passing through the Airports 
 
City Position 
Passengers in 2012 
Total in 2012 
Relative Weight 
Domestic International Domestic International 
SBGR São Paulo 1 21,234,352 11,542,978 32,777,330 64.78% 35.22% 
SBGL Rio de Janeiro 2 13,201,049 4,294,688 17,495,737 75.45% 24.55% 
SBSP São Paulo 3 16,775,770 - 16,775,770 100.00% 0.00% 
SBBR Brasilia 4 15,480,033 411,497 15,891,530 97.41% 2.59% 
SBCF Belo Horizonte 5 9,952,684 445,612 10,398,296 95.71% 4.29% 
SBRJ Rio de Janeiro 6 9,002,863 - 9,002,863 100.00% 0.00% 
SBKP Campinas 7 8,780,290 78,090 8,858,380 99.12% 0.88% 
SBSV Salvador 8 8,502,605 308,935 8,811,540 96.49% 3.51% 
SBPA Porto Alegre 9 7,606,507 654,848 8,261,355 92.07% 7.93% 
SBCT Curitiba 10 6,738,071 90,263 6,828,334 98.68% 1.32% 
SBRF Recife 11 6,221,013 212,397 6,433,410 96.70% 3.30% 
SBFZ Fortaleza 12 5,764,339 199,969 5,964,308 96.65% 3.35% 
SBVT Vitoria 13 3,642,842 - 3,642,842 100.00% 0.00% 
SBFL Florianopolis 14 3,178,877 216,379 3,395,256 93.63% 6.37% 
Source: Infraero in “Anuário Estatístico Operacional”  
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Chart 1 – Evolution of Passenger Traffic in the three major Southern Airports in 2012. 
 
Source: Infraero 
 
EXHIBIT 10 EY Report 
 
Brazilian cities ranked based on FDI. 
 
 
 
4,931,464  
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3,122,035  
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Ranking of the Most Promising Cities in Brazil 
 
Source: EY in Capturing the Momentum – Brazil   
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EXHIBIT 11 TOWS Analysis 
 
 
 
OPPORTUNITIES THREATS 
S
T
R
E
N
G
T
H
S
 
 Take advantage of the strong brand 
and knowledge of the Brazilian 
Market to create stronger entry 
barriers to HIE in these cities; 
 The knowledge of the Brazilian 
market will decrease the opening 
time of the hotel, maybe at time of 
the international events; 
 Use the proximity of Argentina, 
Paraguay and Uruguay to study 
deeper potential entrances in these 
markets. 
 In the eventuality of the amount 
of tourists in these cities decrease 
due to a worse economic 
slowdown, knowing the market 
and having a strong brand would 
help VGE to sustain its numbers; 
 Being careful and having a strong 
brand are qualities that will allow 
VG to locate the best location to 
compete directly with Ibis and 
eliminate other small/not 
specialized hotels 
W
E
A
K
N
E
S
S
E
S
 
 The strong development and 
prospects will most likely create 
what VG considers good 
opportunities (properties for the 
right price), so don’t need to be so 
patient and risk to open too late; 
 The lack of HIE lowers the pressure 
over VG to create excellent express 
hotels right at the beginning. Lack 
 Being extremely careful will give 
time to Ibis to reinforce its 
presence in each town; 
 Using HIE as a benchmark would 
be good to start since it would 
“steal” from Ibis the clients that 
looked for this hotels of IHG, 
creating the competition that 
these cities need; 
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EXHIBIT 12 Hotel Concentration Analysis Maps 
 
Figure 1 – Business Hotels and Ibis Hotels in Curitiba 
  
of competition gives time to 
improve and find the right model; 
 If VG realizes it will need partners 
in the South due to the strong 
development and upcoming events, 
partnerships will not be difficult to 
obtain, since there will be a large 
offer. 
 A Brazilian slowdown would 
affect more VG if its portfolio 
was concentrated in only one 
region (as it is currently).  
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Figure 2 – Business Hotels and Ibis Hotels in Porto Alegre 
 
Figure 3 – Business Hotels and Ibis Hotels in Florianopolis 
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EXHIBIT 13 Occupancy Rate Prospects 
Curitiba      Porto Alegre 
                                  
Source: Hotel Invest 
EXHIBIT 14 Financial Information and Scenarios 
Salaries 
 # Employees Emp. Av. Cost/Month Total Annual Cost 
 Initial Model Proportional1 Assumed Initial Model Assumed Initial Model Assumed 
Lodging 32 20 10 1,200 1,200 460,800 144,000 
F&B 30 18 8 1,400 1,000 504,000 96,000 
Administration 4 3 3 3,000 3,000 144,000 108,000 
Maintenance 3 2 2 1,500 1,500 54,000 36,000 
      1,162,800 384,000 
 
Investment 
 VG (Average Room Size of 28m2) VGE (Benchmarked Room Size of 18m2) 
 Total Per Sq. Meter Total Per Sq. Meter 
Equipment 12,0002 428.57 8,000 444.44 
Without Equipment 88,000 3,142.86 57,600 3,2003 
Total Investment per Room 100,000 3,571.43 65,600 3,644.44 
                                                          
1 Rounded up 
2 12% of the Total Investment per Room, data provided by VG 
3 Value of the Investment per Room without Equipment of a normal VG Hotel rounded up. 
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CURITIBA BENCHMARK 
Rates/ 
Unit 
Price 
Year (Relevant ones showing changes considered in ) 
0 1 2 
 
10 111 
 
152 16 
 
203 21 
 
30 
Rooms Available per Year 120 0 43800 43800 43800 43800 43800 43800 43800 43800 43800 
Average Occupancy Rate  0 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 
Occupied Rooms per Year  0 31536 31536 31536 31536 31536 31536 31536 31536 31536 
Paid Nights (Freq. Index) 1 0 31536 31536 31536 31536 31536 31536 31536 31536 31536 
Average Room Price 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
R
e
v
. Lodging  0 1892160 1892160 1892160 1892160 1892160 1892160 1892160 1892160 1892160 
F&B 5 0 157680 157680 157680 157680 157680 157680 157680 157680 157680 
Total Revenues  0 2049840 2049840 2049840 2049840 2049840 2049840 2049840 2049840 2049840 
O
p
e
r
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
C
o
st
s 
L
o
d
g
in
g
 # Employees  0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Employees' cost 14400 0 144000 144000 144000 144000 144000 144000 144000 144000 144000 
Other Lodging Costs 0.05 0 94608 94608 94608 94608 94608 94608 94608 94608 94608 
Total Lodg. Costs  0 238608 238608 238608 238608 238608 238608 238608 238608 238608 
(Lodging Results)  0 1653552 1653552 1653552 1653552 1653552 1653552 1653552 1653552 1653552 
F
&
B
 
# Employees  0 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Employees' cost 12000 0 96000 96000 96000 96000 96000 96000 96000 96000 96000 
Direct Costs 0.3 0 47304 47304 47304 47304 47304 47304 47304 47304 47304 
Other F&B Costs 0.03 0 4730.4 4730.4 4730.4 4730.4 4730.4 4730.4 4730.4 4730.4 4730.4 
Total F&B Costs  0 148034.4 148034.4 148034.4 148034.4 148034.4 148034.4 148034.4 148034.4 148034.4 
(F&B Results)  0 9645.6 9645.6 9645.6 9645.6 9645.6 9645.6 9645.6 9645.6 9645.6 
A
d
m
in
is
t.
 # Employees  0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Employees' cost 36000 0 108000 108000 108000 108000 108000 108000 108000 108000 108000 
Other Costs 0.01 0 20498.4 20498.4 20498.4 20498.4 20498.4 20498.4 20498.4 20498.4 20498.4 
Total Administ. Costs  0 128498.4 128498.4 128498.4 128498.4 128498.4 128498.4 128498.4 128498.4 128498.4 
M
ai
n
te
n
. # Employees  0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Employees' cost 18000 0 36000 36000 36000 36000 36000 36000 36000 36000 36000 
Other Costs 0.03 0 61495.2 61495.2 61495.2 61495.2 61495.2 61495.2 61495.2 61495.2 61495.2 
Total Mainten. Costs  0 97495.2 97495.2 97495.2 97495.2 97495.2 97495.2 97495.2 97495.2 97495.2 
Energy 5 0 157680 157680 157680 157680 157680 157680 157680 157680 157680 
Marketing 0.0317 0 64979.928 64979.928 64979.928 64979.928 64979.928 64979.928 64979.928 64979.928 64979.928 
Others 0.0236 0 48376.224 48376.224 48376.224 48376.224 48376.224 48376.224 48376.224 48376.224 48376.224 
Total Operational Costs  0 883672.152 883672.152 883672.152 883672.152 883672.152 883672.152 883672.152 883672.152 883672.152 
EBITDA  0 1166167.848 1166167.848 1166167.848 1166167.848 1166167.848 1166167.848 1166167.848 1166167.848 1166167.848 
D
e
p
r
e
c
. Land&Building 0.05 0 334560 334560 334560 334560 334560 334560 334560 0 0 
Equipment&Forniture 0.067 0 78720 78720 78720 78720 78720 55104 55104 55104 55104 
Total Annual Deprec.  0 413280 413280 413280 413280 413280 389664 389664 55104 55104 
EBIT  0 752887.848 752887.848 752887.848 752887.848 752887.848 776503.848 776503.848 1111063.848 1111063.848 
Interests  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                                                          
1 First year with positive cumulative Cash Flow 
2 Remodel year. Considering 80% of the Investment at year 0.  
3 End of building depreciation 
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E
B
T
 
in Euros  0 752887.848 752887.848 
 
752887.848 752887.848 
 
752887.848 776503.848 
 
776503.848 1111063.848 
 
1111063.848 
In Reals (for the IRPJ) 2.7294 0 2054898.217 2054898.217 2054898.217 2054898.217 2054898.217 2119354.664 2119354.664 3032487.675 3032487.675 
T
a
x
e
s 
IRPJ5 (in Euros) 0.15 0 179429.216 179429.216 179429.216 179429.216 179429.216 185333.2352 185333.2352 268973.5071 268973.5071 
CSLL6 0.09 0 67759.90632 67759.90632 67759.90632 67759.90632 67759.90632 69885.34632 69885.34632 99995.74632 99995.74632 
PIS/PASEP7 0.0165 0 12422.64949 12422.64949 12422.64949 12422.64949 12422.64949 12812.31349 12812.31349 18332.55349 18332.55349 
COFINS8 0.076 0 57219.47645 57219.47645 57219.47645 57219.47645 57219.47645 59014.29245 59014.29245 84440.85245 84440.85245 
ISS9 0.05 0 102492 102492 102492 102492 102492 102492 102492 102492 102492 
ITBI10 0.02 157440 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Taxes11  157440 419323.2483 419323.2483 419323.2483 419323.2483 419323.2483 429537.1875 429537.1875 574234.6594 574234.6594 
Earnings  -157440 333564.5997 333564.5997 333564.5997 333564.5997 333564.5997 346966.6605 346966.6605 536829.1886 536829.1886 
Depreciations  0 413280 413280 413280 413280 413280 389664 389664 55104 55104 
C
a
p
E
X
 
Land&Building 0.85 6691200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Equipment&Forniture 0.15 1180800 0 0 0 0 826560 0 0 0 0 
Total CapEX12  7872000 0 0 0 0 826560 0 0 0 0 
                
FCF  -8029440 746844.5997 746844.5997 
 
746844.5997 746844.5997 
 
-79715.40031 736630.6605 
 
736630.6605 591933.1886 
 
591933.1886 
(Actualized FCF)  -8029440 678949.6361 617226.9419 287940.9237 261764.4761 -19083.23305 160312.294 109495.4539 79988.26973 33922.83469 
Cumulative FCF  -8029440 -7282595.4 -6535750.801 -560994.0031 185850.5966 2346668.995 3083299.656 6029822.298 6621755.487 11949154.18 
(Cum. Actualized FCF)  -8029440 -7350490.364 -6733263.422 -3440403.24 -3178638.764 -2546752.488 -2386440.194 -1878271.793 -1798283.523 -1337629.173 
 
Financial Indicators: Curitiba’s Benchmark 
Cost of Equity 10% 
NPV -1,337,629.17€ 
PI 0.829 
Annualized Benefit -141,894.70€ 
                                                          
4 Rate provided by Bloomberg, computed using geometric average for a 10 years weekly data 
5 Computed over the EBT (15% over the total results, plus 10% over the annual EBT share over 240,000 Reals) 
6 Computed over the EBT 
7 Computed over the EBT 
8 Computed over the EBT 
9 Computed over the Total Revenues 
10 Computed over the Total CapEX 
11 There is one Municipal Tax (IPTU) that was not considered since it depends of the property value each year 
12 Computed by multiplying the Total Investment per Room (see Investment Table) by the number of rooms 
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF VILA GALÉ TO THE SOUTH OF BRAZIL 
47 
 
 
PORTO ALEGRE BENCHMARK 
Rates/ 
Unit 
Price 
Year (Relevant ones showing changes considered in ) 
0 1 2 
 
8 9 
 
15 16 
 
20 21 
 
30 
Rooms Available per Year 120 0 43800 43800 43800 43800 43800 43800 43800 43800 43800 
Average Occupancy Rate 80% 0% 80% 80% 0.8 0.8 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 
Occupied Rooms per Year  0 35040 35040 35040 35040 35040 35040 35040 35040 35040 
Paid Nights (Freq. Index) 1 0 35040 35040 35040 35040 35040 35040 35040 35040 35040 
Average Room Price 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 
R
e
v
. Lodging  0 2312640 2312640 2312640 2312640 2312640 2312640 2312640 2312640 2312640 
F&B 5 0 175200 175200 175200 175200 175200 175200 175200 175200 175200 
Total Revenues  0 2487840 2487840 2487840 2487840 2487840 2487840 2487840 2487840 2487840 
O
p
e
r
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
C
o
st
s 
L
o
d
g
in
g
 # Employees  0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Employees' cost 0 0 144000 144000 144000 144000 144000 144000 144000 144000 144000 
Other Lodging Costs 5% 0 115632 115632 115632 115632 115632 115632 115632 115632 115632 
Total Lodg. Costs  0 259632 259632 259632 259632 259632 259632 259632 259632 259632 
(Lodging Results)  0 2053008 2053008 2053008 2053008 2053008 2053008 2053008 2053008 2053008 
F
&
B
 
# Employees  0 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Employees' cost 0 0 96000 96000 96000 96000 96000 96000 96000 96000 96000 
Direct Costs 30% 0 52560 52560 52560 52560 52560 52560 52560 52560 52560 
Other F&B Costs 3% 0 5256 5256 5256 5256 5256 5256 5256 5256 5256 
Total F&B Costs  0 153816 153816 153816 153816 153816 153816 153816 153816 153816 
(F&B Results)  0 21384 21384 21384 21384 21384 21384 21384 21384 21384 
A
d
m
in
is
t 
# Employees  0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Employees' cost 0 0 108000 108000 108000 108000 108000 108000 108000 108000 108000 
Other Costs 1% 0 24878.4 24878.4 24878.4 24878.4 24878.4 24878.4 24878.4 24878.4 24878.4 
Total Administ Costs  0 132878.4 132878.4 132878.4 132878.4 132878.4 132878.4 132878.4 132878.4 132878.4 
M
ai
n
te
n
. # Employees  0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Employees' cost 0 0 36000 36000 36000 36000 36000 36000 36000 36000 36000 
Other Costs 3% 0 74635.2 74635.2 74635.2 74635.2 74635.2 74635.2 74635.2 74635.2 74635.2 
Total Mainten. Costs  0 110635.2 110635.2 110635.2 110635.2 110635.2 110635.2 110635.2 110635.2 110635.2 
Energy 5 0 175200 175200 175200 175200 175200 175200 175200 175200 175200 
Marketing 3.17% 0 78864.528 78864.528 78864.528 78864.528 78864.528 78864.528 78864.528 78864.528 78864.528 
Others 2.36% 0 58713.024 58713.024 58713.024 58713.024 58713.024 58713.024 58713.024 58713.024 58713.024 
Total Operational Costs  0 969739.152 969739.152 969739.152 969739.152 969739.152 969739.152 969739.152 969739.152 969739.152 
EBITDA  0 1518100.848 1518100.848 1518100.848 1518100.848 1518100.848 1518100.848 1518100.848 1518100.848 1518100.848 
D
e
p
. Land&Building 5% 0 334560 334560 334560 334560 334560 334560 334560 0 0 
Equipment&Forniture 6.67% 0 78720 78720 78720 78720 78720 55104 55104 55104 55104 
Total Annual Deprec  0 413280 413280 413280 413280 413280 389664 389664 55104 55104 
EBIT  0 1104820.848 1104820.848 1104820.848 1104820.848 1104820.848 1128436.848 1128436.848 1462996.848 1462996.848 
Interest  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EBT 
(in Euros)  0 1104820.848 1104820.848 1104820.848 1104820.848 1104820.848 1128436.848 1128436.848 1462996.848 1462996.848 
(in Reals) 0 0 3015448.312 3015448.312 3015448.312 3015448.312 3015448.312 3079904.76 3079904.76 3993037.77 3993037.77 
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Tax 
IRPJ 15% 0 267412.752 267412.752 
 
267412.752 267412.752 
 
267412.752 273316.7712 
 
273316.7712 356957.0431 
 
356957.0431 
CSLL 9% 0 99433.87632 99433.87632 99433.87632 99433.87632 99433.87632 101559.3163 101559.3163 131669.7163 131669.7163 
PIS/PASEP 1.65% 0 18229.54399 18229.54399 18229.54399 18229.54399 18229.54399 18619.20799 18619.20799 24139.44799 24139.44799 
COFINS 7.60% 0 83966.38445 83966.38445 83966.38445 83966.38445 83966.38445 85761.20045 85761.20045 111187.7604 111187.7604 
ISS 5% 0 124392 124392 124392 124392 124392 124392 124392 124392 124392 
ITBI 2% 157440 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Taxes  157440 593434.5568 593434.5568 593434.5568 593434.5568 593434.5568 603648.496 603648.496 748345.9679 748345.9679 
Earnings  -157440 511386.2912 511386.2912 511386.2912 511386.2912 511386.2912 524788.352 524788.352 714650.8801 714650.8801 
Depreciations  0 413280 413280 413280 413280 413280 389664 389664 55104 55104 
C
a
p
E
X
 Land&Building 85% 6691200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Equipment&Forniture 15% 1180800 0 0 0 0 826560 0 0 0 0 
Total CapEX  7872000 0 0 0 0 826560 0 0 0 0 
                
FCF  -8029440 924666.2912 924666.2912 
 
924666.2912 924666.2912 
 
98106.2912 914452.352 
 
914452.352 769754.8801 
 
769754.8801 
(Actualized FCF)  -8029440 840605.7193 764187.0175 431363.6491 392148.7719 23485.86611 199011.4751 135927.5153 104017.4164 44113.53858 
Cumulative FCF  -8029440 -7104773.709 -6180107.418 -632109.6704 292556.6208 5013994.368 5928446.72 9586256.128 10356011.01 17283804.93 
(Cumulative Actualized FCF)  -8029440 -7188834.281 -6424647.263 -3096413.579 -2704264.807 -1194226.565 -995215.0895 -364375.4912 -260358.0748 338680.7037 
 
Financial Indicators: Porto Alegre’s Benchmark 
Cost of Equity 10% 
NPV 338,680.70€  
PI 1.037 
Annualized Benefit 35,926.99€  
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Scenario Analysis - CURITIBA 
Changing Investment without Equipment per m2 
Scenario 
Cheap and 
Simple 
Cheap Simple Benchmark Elaborated Expensive 
Invest. Without 
Equip./m2 
2300 2600 2900 3200 3500 3800 
In
d
. 
Total Invest. 5928000 6576000 7224000 7872000 8520000 9168000 
NPV 315,231.52€ -235,722.04€ -786,675.61€ -1,337,629.17€ -1,888,582.74€ -2,439,536.30€ 
PI 1.047 0.960 0.889 0.829 0.779 0.735 
Changing Amount of Rooms 
Scenario Smallest Smaller Benchmark Larger Largest 
Amount of Rooms 80 100 120 140 160 
In
d
. 
Total Investment 5248000 6560000 7872000 9184000 10496000 
NPV -1,548,891.46€ -1,443,260.32€ -1,337,629.17€ -1,231,998.03€ -1,126,366.89€ 
PI 0.707 0.780 0.829 0.864 0.890 
Changing Amount of Rooms and Investment without Equipment per m2 (negative correlation) 
Scenario Cheap and Largest 
Simple and 
Larger 
Benchmark 
Elaborated and 
Smaller 
Expensive and 
Smallest 
Invest. Without 
Equip./m2 
2600 2900 3200 3500 3700 
Amount of Rooms 160 140 120 100 80 
In
d
. 
Invest/Room 54800 60200 65600 71000 74600 
Total Investment 8768000 8428000 7872000 7100000 5968000 
NPV 342,842.62€ -589,218.87€ -1,337,629.17€ -1,902,388.29€ -2,161,062.09€ 
PI 1.033 0.927 0.829 0.734 0.642 
Changing Amount of Rooms and Investment without Equipment per m2 (positive correlation) 
Scenario 
Cheap and 
Smallest 
Simple and 
Smaller 
Benchmark 
Elaborated and 
Larger 
Expensive and 
Largest 
Inv. Without Equip./m2 80 100 120 140 160 
Amount of Rooms 2600 2900 3200 3500 3800 
In
d
. 
Invest/Room 54800 60200 65600 71000 76400 
Total Investment 4384000 6020000 7872000 9940000 12224000 
NPV -814,286.70€ -984,132.34€ -1,337,629.17€ -1,874,777.19€ -2,595,576.40€ 
PI 0.814 0.836 0.829 0.811 0.788 
Changing Prices 
Scenario Lower Low Benchmark High Higher 
Price 50 55 60 65 70 
In
d
. NPV -2,630,951.92€ -1,984,290.55€ -1,337,629.17€ -690,967.80€ -44,306.42€ 
PI 0.669 0.749 0.829 0.909 0.989 
Changing Annual Average Occupancy Rate 
Scenario Pessimistic 
MidScale 
Prospects 
Benchmark Optimistic 
Porto Alegre 
Prospects 
Av. Annual OR 64% 68% 72% 76% 80% 
In
d
. NPV -2,151,723.88€ -1,744,676.53€ -1,337,629.17€ -930,581.82€ -523,534.46€ 
PI 0.728 0.779 0.829 0.880 0.930 
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Changing Prices and Annual Average Occupancy Rate (negative correlation) 
Scenario Lower Low Benchmark High Higher 
Price 50 55 60 65 70 
Av. Annual Occ. Rate 80% 76% 72% 68% 64% 
In
d
. NPV -1,960,559.74€ -1,613,168.82€ -1,337,629.17€ -1,133,940.79€ -1,002,103.66€ 
PI 0.752 0.795 0.829 0.854 0.871 
Changing Prices and Amount of Rooms (negative correlation) 
Scenario 
Lower and 
Largest 
Low, Larger Benchmark 
High and 
Smaller 
Higher and, 
Smallest 
Amount of Rooms 160 140 120 100 80 
Price 50 55 60 65 70 
In
d
. NPV -2,850,797.22€ -1,986,436.30€ -1,337,629.17€ -904,375.84€ -686,676.29€ 
PI 0.730 0.784 0.829 0.861 0.867 
Changing Prices and Amount of Rooms (positive correlation) 
Scenario 
Smallest and 
Lower 
Smaller and 
Low 
Benchmark Larger and High 
Largest and 
Higher 
Amount of Rooms 80 100 120 140 160 
Price 50 55 60 65 70 
In
d
. NPV -2,411,106.62€ -1,982,144.79€ -1,337,629.17€ -477,559.76€ 598,063.44€ 
PI 0.547 0.700 0.829 0.944 1.051 
 
Scenario Analysis – PORTO ALEGRE 
Changing Amount of Rooms 
Scenario Smallest Smaller Benchmark Larger Largest 
Amount of Rooms 80 100 120 140 160 
In
d
. 
NPV -431,351.54€ -46,335.42€ 338,680.70€ 723,696.83€ 1,108,712.95€ 
PI 0.915 0.988 1.037 1.072 1.098 
Total Investment 5248000 6560000 7872000 9184000 10496000 
Changing Investment without Equipment per m2 
Scenarios Cheapest Cheaper Benchmark Elaborated Expensive 
Invest. Without 
Equip./m2 
2600 2900 3200 3500 3800 
In
d
. 
NPV 1,440,587.84€ 889,634.27€ 338,680.70€ -212,272.86€ -763,226.43€ 
PI 1.209 1.115 1.037 0.971 0.914 
Invest/Room 54800 60200 65600 71000 76400 
Total Investment 6576000 7224000 7872000 8520000 9168000 
Changing Amount of Rooms and Investment without Equipment per m2 (negative correlation) 
Scenarios 
Cheapest and 
Largest 
Cheaper and 
Larger 
Benchmark 
Elaborated and 
Smaller 
Expensive and 
Smallest 
Invest. Without 
Equip./m2 
2600 2900 3200 3500 3800 
Amount of Rooms 160 140 120 100 80 
In
d
. 
NPV 2,577,922.46€ 1,366,475.99€ 338,680.70€ -505,463.39€ -1,165,956.29€ 
PI 1.282 1.153 1.037 0.926 0.809 
Invest/Room 54800 60200 65600 71000 76400 
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Total Investment 8768000 8428000 7872000 7100000 6112000 
Changing Amount of Rooms and Investment without Equipment per m2 (positive correlation) 
Scenarios 
Cheapest and 
Smallest 
Cheaper and 
Smaller 
Benchmark 
Elaborated and 
Larger 
Expensive and 
Largest 
Invest. Without 
Equip./m2 
2600 2900 3200 3500 3800 
Amount of Rooms 80 100 120 140 160 
In
d
. 
NPV 303,253.21€ 412,792.55€ 338,680.70€ 80,917.67€ -360,496.56€ 
PI 1.062 1.062 1.037 1.003 0.966 
Invest/Room 54800 60200 65600 71000 76400 
Total Investment 4384000 6020000 7872000 9940000 12224000 
Changing Annual Average Occupancy Rate 
Scenarios 
MidScale 
Prospects 
Lower 
Prospects 
Benchmark 
Higher 
Prospects 
Optimistic 
Av. Annual Occ. Rate 68% 74% 80% 86% 92% 
In
d
. NPV -1,011,793.64€ -336,556.47€ 338,680.70€ 1,013,917.87€ 1,689,155.04€ 
PI 0.870 0.953 1.037 1.121 1.204 
Source: Results from Scenario Analysis applied to the two Benchmark Models. 
 
EXHIBIT 15 Ibis’ Prices 
 
Ibis Prices for 2014 (four random dates within 3 months interval). 
IBIS CURITIBA (Prices 
in €) 
Jan Apr Jul Oct Annual Average 
Centro Civico 44.75 44.75 44.75 46.35 45.15 
Shopping 49.22 52.42 60.41 52.42 53.62 
Batel 57.53 55.93 60.73 60.73 58.73 
Average 50.50 51.03 55.30 53.17 52.50 
 
IBIS PORTO ALEGRE 
(Prices in €) 
Jan Apr Jul Oct Annual Average 
Moinhos de Vento 66.8 66.8 66.8 66.8 66.8 
Aeroporto 66.8 66.8 70 66.8 67.6 
Average 66.8 66.8 68.4 66.8 67.2 
Source: Ibis Website 
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EXHIBIT 16 Implementation Process 
 
Source: own assemblage 
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ENDNOTES 
 
i “Deloitte – Atlas da Hotelaria 2012” 
ii Professional Association of Innkeepers International at 
http://www.innkeeping.org/?The_Industry 
iii InterContinental Hotel Group Website 
iv Accor Group Website 
v O Indice de Desenvolvimento Humano Municipal Brasileiro p.44 
vi Ranking presented by the Internet World Stats at 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/top20.htm 
vii Info provided by Independ Statistics & Analysis from the US Energy Information 
Administration at http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=BR 
viii Climate information provided at http://www.brcactaceae.org/climate.html 
ix Capacity Data extracted from each Airport Webpage at 
http://www.infraero.gov.br/index.php/br/aeroportos.html 
x Hotel Invest – Brazilian Hotel Market Overview 2011-2012 
 
